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Bankruptcy
by Honorable John T. Laney, IIP
and William J. Diehl'
This Article surveys opinions decided in 2017 that will impact
bankruptcy law practice in the Eleventh Circuit. These decisions come
from the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States District Courts, and
Bankruptcy Courts. While courts in the Eleventh Circuit have addressed
other important questions pertinent to bankruptcy law, this Article
focuses on select decisions that the Authors believe will have the greatest
impact on the readers' practices. The Article first updates cases cited in
last year's annual survey. The Article continues by discussing cases
involving bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction, appeals of bankruptcy court
orders, abuse in Chapter 71 cases, treatment of secured claims in Chapter
132 plans, and finally, dischargeability.
I. UPDATES ON 2016's BANKRUPTCY SURvEY
Last year's survey discussed two cases that have received subsequent
appellate review. 3 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to resolve the circuit split created by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Midland Funding, LLC

*United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1964); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1966). Member,
Mercer Law Review (1964-1966); Co-Editor in Chief (1965-1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
-Law Clerk to the Hon. John T. Laney, III. Georgia State University (A.B., 2009);
Georgia State University College of Law (J.D. magna cum laude, 2017). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2018).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2018).
3. Hon. John T. Laney, III & Nicholas J. Garcia, Bankruptcy, Eleventh Circuit Survey,
68 MERCER L. REV. 929 (2017) [hereinafter "2016 Bankruptcy Survey"].
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v. Johnson.4 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered its decision
in Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp.,5 in an en banc proceeding. 6 Each of these
cases is discussed in the following subsections.
A. Stale Debt Collection
In Midland FundingLLC v. Johnson,7 the Supreme Court reversed
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.8 The
Supreme Court held that filing a proof of claim for a time-barred debt is
permitted by Title 11 of the United States Code (Code)9 and does not
impose liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDPCA).1o
To briefly summarize the issues before the Supreme Court, this litigation
arose when Midland Funding, LLC, a delinquent-debt purchaser, filed a
proof of claim in the debtor's Chapter 13 case.' 1 The debt alleged in the
proof of claim originated more than ten years before the debtor filed her
bankruptcy petition.1 2 Accordingly, Alabama's statute of limitations
prevented the creditor from collecting the debt through a state court
action.' 3 Outside of bankruptcy, the FDCPA's prohibition on using "false,
deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with
collection of debt"1 4 may impose liability on a creditor using a legal
proceeding to collect a time-barred debt.15

4. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). Compare Johnson v. Midland Funding, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th
Cir. 2014) with In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2016); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC,
832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016); Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 828 F.3d 749 (8th Cir.
2016). See also 2016 Bankruptcy Survey, supra note 3, at 934-36 (discussing the circuit
split).
5. 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016).
6. The three-judge panel decision is reported at 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016). For a
discussion of that decision, see 2016 Bankruptcy Survey supra note 3, at 946-48. The en
banc decision is reported at 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2016).
7. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).
8. Id. at 1415-16.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2018).
10. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874 (1977); Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1415.
11. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.
12. Id.
13. See ALA. CODE § 62-34 (2018).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
15. See McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014)
("Whether a debt is legally enforceable is a central fact about the character and legal status
of that debt. A misrepresentation about that fact thus violates the FDCPA.'); Phillips v.
Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013); Jenkins v. Gen. Collection Co.,
538 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (Neb. D.C. 2008); Palmer v. Dynamic Recovery Sols., LLC, No.
6:15-cv-59-Orl-40(KRS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59229, at *12 (M.D. Fla. 2016); cf. Wallace
v. Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (D. Md. 2001) ("[N]o violation of the FDCPA
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In Crawford v. LVNVFunding, LLC,16 the Eleventh Circuit found that
filing a proof of claim on time-barred debt to recover through Chapter 13
distributions similarly violated the FDCPA.17 The court in Crawford,
however, declined to determine whether its ruling placed the FDCPA in
irreconcilable conflict with the Bankruptcy Code, and accordingly,
whether one statute precluded the other.18 The Eleventh Circuit
ultimately addressed this issue in Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC.19
20
There, the court found the FDCPA and the Code were not in conflict.

Rather, the court determined that although the Code permits creditors
to file proofs of claim for time-barred debt, it does not "free [debtcollectors] from all consequences of filing these claims." 21 Accordingly, the
misleading
or
deceptive,
on
"false,
prohibitions
FDCPA's
representation[s]" were applicable to debt collectors' proofs of claim in
bankruptcy proceedings. 22
On appeal, the Supreme Court circumvented the question of whether
23
the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code were in irreconcilable conflict.
Instead, the Court focused on two issues: (1) whether seeking distribution
through filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt could be either false,
deceptive, or misleading (within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e); and
(2) whether filing such a proof of claim was an "unfair or unconscionable
means" of collecting a debt (within the meaning § 1692f).24 The Court first
addressed the argument that filing a proof of claim to collect a timebarred debt was false, deceptive, or misleading. 25 In its analysis, the
Court cited numerous state court opinions explaining the nature of a
statute of limitation defense. 26 These many opinions, the Court noted,
explain that the statute of limitation defense provides an affirmative
defense to judicial enforcement of a debt but does not extinguish the right
to payment. 27 Rather, a creditor retains that right even if the affirmative
occurs solely because a debt validation notice silent on the time-bar issue is sent to the
debtor.").
16. 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
17. Id. at 1262.
18. Id. at 1262 n.7.
19. 823 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016).
20. Id. at 1338.
21. Id. at 1338-39.
22. Id. at 1339 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
23. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.
24. Id. at 1410 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)-(f)).
25. Id. at 1411 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
26. Id. at 1411-12; Sallaz v. Rice, 384 P.3d 987, 992-93 (Idaho 2016); Notte v. Merch.
Mut. Ins. Co., 888 A.2d 464, 469 (N.J. 2006)).
27. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1412.
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defense would defeat any judicial action to collect the debt. 28 Given the

nature of time-barred debt, the Court determined that these rights to
payment fit within the Code's broad definition of a claim, which does not
require a claim to be reduced to judgment.29 Therefore, the Court
concluded that if the Code allows a creditor to file a time-barred proof of
claim, filing the claim cannot be false, deceptive, or misleading and, thus,
cannot impose liability under the FDCPA.30
Second, the Court considered whether filing a proof of claim on a timebarred debt is unfair or unconscionable. 3 1 To begin addressing this
question, the Court assumed-without deciding the issue-that filing a
civil suit to collect time-barred debt is unfair or unconscionable and
would expose a debt collector to liability under the FDCPA. 32 The Court,
however, distinguished civil collection proceedings from a bankruptcy
proceeding, noting that a consumer voluntarily initiates a Chapter 13
proceeding. 33 Additionally, the Court noted that Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy

Procedure

300134

provides

a

streamlined

process for

resolving disputed claims, and the Code requires a Chapter 13 trustee to
review all claims filed.35 These procedural safeguards, the Court
reasoned, "make it considerably more likely that an effort to collect upon
a [time-barred debt] in bankruptcy will be met with resistance, objection,
and disallowance." 36 Accordingly, the Court could not hold filing a proof
of claim on a stale debt was unconscionable.3 7
In a dissent authored by Justice Sotomayor, a three-justice minority
argued that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt is unfair and
unconscionable and that the FDCPA's prohibitions should apply in
bankruptcy proceedings.38 The dissent began by describing debt buyers'
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2018) (defining a claim as the "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.").
30. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
31. Id. at 1413 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)).
32. Id. For decisions holding that filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt is unfair
or unconscionable, see infra note 118.
33. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1413-14.
34. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3)(A) (2018).
35. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1413--14; 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2018). The U.S.
Trustee assigns a Chapter 13 trustee who is charged with reviewing each claim filed in the
case. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a). Further, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide a
process for reviewing and disputing claims. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3)(A).
36. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1414.
37. Id.
38. Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined Justice Sotomayor in her dissent. Id. at 1416.
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general operating procedure: where debt collectors purchase time-barred
accounts for "pennies on the dollar" and use civil actions to collect these
accounts in the "hope .

.

. that consumers will fail either to invoke the

statute of limitations or to respond at all." 39 Despite the FDCPA's success
in "beat[ing] back" the practice of filing state-court actions on time-barred
debt, the dissent feared bankruptcy courts have become debt buyers'
"new forum" for seeking repayment on these debts. 40 Although the
majority's opinion relied on procedural and administrative differences
between these forums, the dissent noted that none of these distinctions
supported "the weight [the majority] placed on it."41 For example,
Chapter 13 trustees in practice are unable to examine and identify each
time-barred claim in every bankruptcy case assigned to the trustee. 42
Given these obstacles, the dissent concluded by stating, "It takes only the
common sense to conclude that one should not be able to profit on the
inadvertent inattention of others. It is said that the law should not be a
trap for the unwary. Today's decision sets just such a trap." 43
B. Judicial Estoppel
After Judge Tjoflat's lengthy concurrence in Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp."
encouraged the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider its holdings on judicial
estoppel, 45 the court reheard the case en banc. 46 As last year's survey
explained in more detail, 47 the plaintiff and debtor in Slater I filed a sex
and race discrimination suit against U.S. Steel, her former employer.
Subsequently, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy but failed to disclose her
lawsuit against U.S. Steel in the petition. As a result, U.S. Steel argued
judicial estoppel prevented Slater from asserting her claim and moved
for summary judgement. 48 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama found Slater knew about her civil claims
against U.S. Steel at the time of filing her petition, and accordingly, the

39. Id. at 1416-17 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
40. Id. The dissent quotes previous decisions describing the volume of this practice as
a "deluge" and a "plague." Id. at 1418.
41. Id. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1421.
44. 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017).
45. Id. at 1189 (Tjoflat, J., concurring), rev'd, Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 820 F.3d 1193
(11th Cir. 2017). Hereinafter, the three-panel judge decision will be referenced as Slater L
46. Slater, 871 F.3d 1174 [hereinafter Slater en banc.
47. See 2016 Bankruptcy Survey, supra note 3, at 946-48.
48. Slater en banc, 871 F.3d at 1177-78.
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doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibited Slater from pursuing the claim. 49
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined its precedent required the
district court to apply judicial estoppel.50
Though many federal courts have acknowledged judicial estoppel
limits abuse where litigants have presented contrary facts to a tribunal,
many have struggled in delineating the exact boundaries of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court recognized judicial estoppel in New Hampshire v.
Maine,5 ' but declined to establish an "exhaustive formula" for
determining whether to apply the doctrine. 52 Instead, the Court
recognized common factors other courts of appeal have used to determine
whether invoking judicial estoppel is appropriate. 53 Still, federal courts
have announced different iterations of the doctrine. 54 Opinions by the
Eleventh Circuit have distilled the doctrine's factors to a two-part test.5 5
"First, it must be shown that the allegedly inconsistent positions were
made under oath in a prior proceeding."5 6 Secondly, the movant must
show the party offering inconsistent positions intended to make "a
mockery of the judicial system."5 7 As to the second element, the court
must find that the party intentionally made contradictory
representations, not that the inconsistent statements were made in error
or were inadvertent.58 Though this appears to present a question of fact,
Eleventh Circuit case law directed trial courts to infer intent unless the
debtor lacked knowledge of the undisclosed assets or had no motive to

49. Id.
50. Slater I, 820 F.3d at 1209-10.
51. 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
52. Id. at 750-51.
53. Id. The Court recognized the following factors: that the party has asserted
inconsistent positions; that the party had success in persuading a court to accept the earlier
position; and that the party would "derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment . .. if not estopped." Id. at 751.
54. Compare Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.30, at 134-62 (3d ed.
2000)) with Superior Crewboats, Inc. v. Primary P&I Underwriters (In re Superior
Crewboats, Inc.), 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1988) and Scarano v. Central Ry. Co. of N.J.,
203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
55. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, M.D., 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001).
56. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, M.D.,
260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)).
57. Id. (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, M.D., 260 F.3d 1302, 1308
(11th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 1085 (2002)).
58. Am. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983).
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conceal them.5 9 Consequently, judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context
often prevented the debtor or the bankruptcy estate from recovering an
undisclosed asset unless the debtor did not know of the asset's existence
or had no motive to conceal it. As Judge Tjoflat explained in his
concurrence, this presumption prevented the trustee from liquidating an
estate-asset and operated as a windfall to the defendant at the expense
of the other estate's creditors.60
The Eleventh Circuit took advantage of this opportunity to overrule
its confusing and potentially overbroad precedent. The court
acknowledged
its precedent was,
in certain circumstances,
contradicting.6 1 For example, the court noted its decision in Parker v.
Wendy's International,Inc., 62 which held judicial estoppel did not apply
to a bankruptcy trustee litigating the claim on the behalf of the estate,63
could not be reconciled with its decision in Barger v. City of Cartersville,64
where judicial estoppel prevented the trustee from litigating undisclosed
claims.65 Further, decisions conflictingly applied the inference that the
inconsistent statements were made to make a mockery of the judicial
system if the debtor knew of the asset's existence. In Ajaka v.
BrooksAmerica Mortgage Corp.,66 for example, the court reversed the
district court's application of judicial estoppel in a Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)67 action. 68 There, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia inferred the plaintiff intended to make a
mockery of the judicial system (and accordingly, applied judicial estoppel)
because the plaintiff was aware of his claim yet failed to disclose it in his
bankruptcy schedules.6 9 The court of appeals reversed because it
determined the plaintiff directed his attorney to amend his bankruptcy
schedules, and accordingly, whether the plaintiff intended to conceal the
claim was a question of material fact for the district court to determine. 70

59. See Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010); Barger v.
City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2003); Advantus Corp. v. Alen, 2015
U.S. Dist. Lexis 94001 at *5 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
60. Slater I, 820 F.3d at 1238-39 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
63. Id. at 1272.
64. 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 1297.
66. 453 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006).
67. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
68. Ajaka, 453 F.3d at 1342.
69. See id. at 1343.
70. Id. at 1346.
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Because the inference adopted in Barger and Ajaka had the potential
to be overly conclusive, the Eleventh Circuit rejected that line of cases,
and instead held courts should consider all facts and circumstances
surrounding the nondisclosure. 71 The court acknowledged certain
circumstances district courts should consider in making this
determination. 72 For example, a court could consider the plaintiffs
sophistication, whether the disclosures were corrected, and whether the
plaintiff disclosed similar claims.73 Undertaking this fact-based inquiry,
the court noted, strengthens judicial integrity and the equitable
principles underlying judicial estoppel and reduces the risk that "civil
defendant[s] will receive an unjustified windfall or that innocent
creditors will be harmed." 74 Judge Carnes wrote a concurring opinion in
which he reiterated that district courts are not required to accept the
debtor's statements explaining his non-disclosure. 75 Rather, the court
should examine all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case
to determine the debtor's reason for failing to disclose the claim. 76
II.

BANKRUPTCY COURTS' JURISDICTION

Ultimately, bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction derives from the referring
district court's jurisdiction.77 Section 1334 of Title 28 of the United States
Code grants district courts the exclusive jurisdiction "of all cases under
Title 1 ."78 District courts delegate this jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts
by referring all cases under the Code pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157.79 Once
in the bankruptcy court, § 157(b) 80 limits the court's power to issue orders
and judgments. These limitations depend on whether the matter before
the bankruptcy court is a core or a non-core proceeding.8 1 When a matter
is a "core proceeding," the bankruptcy court may enter final judgments
and orders. 82 When the matter is "non-core," however, a bankruptcy court
may only issue a final order if the matter is "related to a case under Title

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Slater en banc, 871 F.3d at 1186.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1190 (Carnes, J., concurring).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 157.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2018).
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11," and the parties consent to the jurisdiction of the court. 83 In the
absence of such consent, a bankruptcy court may only submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. 84 In 2017, the
Eleventh Circuit issued two decisions further explaining the extent of
related-to jurisdiction.
The most recent of these cases is Estate of Jackson v. Schron (In re
Fundamental Long Care, Inc.).85 In this factually and procedurally
complex case, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction to enjoin parties from pursuing fraudulent
transfer, breach of fiduciary duty, and other actions against non-debtors
in state courts. 86 The court held that bankruptcy courts have related-to
jurisdiction to issue orders enjoining parties from pursuing a state court
action where the action could undermine the bankruptcy estate's claim
against other defendants.87 The case involved the involuntary
bankruptcy of a former nursing home facility and subsequent fraudulent
transfer actions to avoid pre-petition transfers of assets. Prior to the
petition date, the personal injury claimants asserted state court actions
against Trans Healthcare, Inc. (THI). With these actions pending, THI
used a complex series of transactions between subsidiaries and affiliated
corporations to transfer its assets to a newly created entity, Fundamental
Long Term Care, Inc. (FLTC), which THI insiders controlled. After the
state fraudulent transfer statute of limitations ran, THI stopped
defending the personal injury claims and the claimants obtained $1
billion in "empty-chair" judgments against THI.88
When the personal injury claimants discovered THI's asset transfer to
FLTC, they successfully petitioned for FLTC's involuntary Chapter 7
liquidation. Seeking to avoid this transfer, the personal injury claimants
and the Chapter 7 trustee asserted numerous causes of action against
various defendants. Of particular importance to the court's holding, the
personal injury claimants asserted claims against Rubin Schron, a real
estate investor who leased property to THI for operating its nursing home
facilities. These claims, however, failed to allege facts showing Schron
83. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). After recent amendments, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7008 no longer requires a complaint to state whether the matter is a core or noncore proceeding. Rather, pleaders are only required to state whether they consent or does
not consent to the bankruptcy court's entry of a final order. FED. R. BANK. P. 7008 (2016).
Likewise, Rule 7012(b) requires an answer to state whether the defendant consents to the
entry of a final judgment. FED. R. BANK. P. 7012(b) (2018).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2018).
85. 873 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2017).
86. Id. at 1336.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1331-32.
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was personally involved in the transfer; accordingly, the bankruptcy
court dismissed the claims against Schron. The remaining litigants
agreed to settle the litigation for more than $23 million, subject to the
bankruptcy court's approval.8 9 Schron opposed the proposed settlement
agreement, arguing the bankruptcy court should not approve the
settlement without an order enjoining the parties from pursuing future
actions against him, which he argued could "upend the resolution
reached by the bankruptcy court. . . ."9o The bankruptcy court agreed and
enjoined the plaintiffs from pursuing any state court actions "against
Rubin Schron arising out of the nucleus of facts" asserted in the
complaint.91 The court found that this broad injunction was necessary, as
"a settlement of the surviving claims could not be 'fair and equitable' if it
did not also finally resolve the claims against Schron." 92
On appeal, the personal injury claimants argued that the bankruptcy
court exceeded its related-to jurisdiction by enjoining the claimants from
pursuing claims arising from transactions between non-debtor parties.
Because these parties were not debtors in the bankruptcy proceeding, the
claimants argued that judgments against Schron would have no impact
on the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings.9 3 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
disagreed. 94 The court noted that a state court action determining
whether transfers between THI and Schron were fraudulent would have
a direct impact on the estate's fraudulent transfer actions, and thus, the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enjoin these actions.9 5 The court
further explained that because the transfers occurred within a chain of
transactions through affiliates and insiders, any determination of
whether one transfer in the chain was fraudulent would impact the
estate's claims against other parties within the chain.96 For example, if a
state court found the transfer was not fraudulent, that determination
may preclude the estate's ability to pursue an action against other
transferees.9 7 Further, if the state court found the transaction
fraudulent, the claimant's recovery from Schron would be an asset of the
estate because the transfer would have ultimately passed through the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1331-34.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1337-38.
96. Id. at 1338.
97. Id.
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debtor.9 8 Because of these implications on the bankruptcy estate, the
court of appeals determined that a state court action could conceivably
impact the administration of the estate, and therefore, the bankruptcy
court had related-to jurisdiction. 99
In Wortley v. Bakst,100 the Eleventh Circuit also addressed bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction. 101 Specifically, the court addressed whether the
bankruptcy court could enter a final order dismissing an adversary,
where the defendant alleged the bankruptcy trustee's counsel conspired
to obstruct the due process of law and corrupted the judicial process. 102
The facts of the case are unique. The defendant alleged the law firm
retained by the trustee hired the presiding bankruptcy judge's fianc6 in
return for favorable rulings in the pending proceedings. After the
bankruptcy judge recused himself from the case, the defendants filed a
separate action in state court that alleged claims of conspiracy to obstruct
the operation of the law and fraudulent corruption of the judicial process.
After the action was removed to federal court, the bankruptcy court
dismissed these actions on multiple grounds. When the defendant stated
his intent to appeal the dismissal, the bankruptcy court ordered a direct
appeal of the dismissal to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(2)(A).103
Though neither party originally challenged the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction to dismiss these claims, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
threshold issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 104 As
the court explained, § 158 allows the court to hear direct appeals of all
final orders or judgments by a bankruptcy court. 05 Accordingly, the court
began its jurisdictional analysis by determining whether the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to issue a final order, explaining the familiar core
and non-core framework of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. 106 Because the
defendant's claims neither impacted the distribution of the bankruptcy
estate nor implicated rights created by the bankruptcy code, the court

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 844 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2017).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1316.
103. Id. at 1316-17; 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2018).
104. Wortley, 844 F.3d at 1317.
105. Id. at 1317; see also 11 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2018).
106. Wortley, 844 F.3d at 1318 ("Under § 157, a bankruptcy court's authority to enter a
final order or judgment depends on whether a case is categorized as a core proceeding or
non-core proceeding.").
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easily determined the proceeding was not a core proceeding arising under
the Code.107
Whether the defendant's claims were within the bankruptcy court's
related-to jurisdiction was a closer question. The defendant argued that
the claims arose from conduct that "occurred outside the scope" of the law
firm's representation of the trustee and that any judgment would be
against the law firm and would not be an asset of the bankruptcy
estate. 108 Accordingly, the defendants argued the bankruptcy court
exceeded its related-to jurisdiction by dismissing the claims. 109 The court
in Wortley, recognized, however, that related-to jurisdiction extended to
all cases "which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankrupt[cy] estate." 110 The court concluded that
an adjudication of the defendant's claims in the bankruptcy court could
conceivably "challenge the legitimacy of the bankruptcy court
proceedings," by "call[ing] into question . . . [the bankruptcy judge's]
rulings, orders, and judgments."111 Such a challenge to the
administration of the bankruptcy proceeding sufficiently placed the
claims within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.1 12
Though the court determined the bankruptcy court had related-to
jurisdiction, the parties' consent was also required for the bankruptcy
court to issue a final order. 113 Because this limitation created a
procedural issue on appeal (which this Article will address in more detail
in the following section), the court transferred the case to the district
court for the issuance of a final order on the claim.1 14
III. BANKRUPTCY APPEALs

Section 158 governs bankruptcy appeals.11 5 In 2017, courts in the
Eleventh Circuit addressed two issues concerning appeals. The first issue
discussed here is whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. The second issue concerns attorney's fees in appellate litigation.

107. Id. at 1319-20.
108. Id. at 1319.
109. Id. at 1320.
110. Id. at 1319.
111. Id. at 1320.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
114. Wortley, 844 F.3d at 1322. The court directed the district court to consider the
bankruptcy court's unauthorized order as a report with proposed conclusions of law. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2018).
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A. Final Orders and Certified Appeals
United States District Courts, the most common appellate courts in
bankruptcy litigation, have jurisdiction to hear appeals of bankruptcy
courts' final orders and judgments.x1 6 A final order "is one which ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment."1 17 Bankruptcy proceedings, however, are an "aggregation
of controversies" within an extended distribution scheme and,
accordingly, what constitutes a final order requires a "more flexible
interpretation in the bankruptcy context." 118 In the past year, two courts
within the circuit have examined what constitutes a final order in a
bankruptcy proceeding.

In Specialized Loan Servicing LLC v. Herendeen,119 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida heard a loan servicer's
appeal of the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order in a Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)120 claim.1 21 After filing an answer, the
loan servicer's counsel withdrew its representation in the adversary
proceeding. Subsequently, the loan servicer failed to answer discovery
requests and to attend numerous pretrial conferences. Having no
responses from requests for admission, the plaintiff moved for summary
judgment, which the bankruptcy court granted without participation by
the loan servicer. The court's order, however, did not award damages for
the TCPA violation. Two weeks later, the loan servicer obtained counsel
and requested relief from the court's summary judgment order.1 22 The
court denied the motion, stating the loan servicer's failure to obtain
counsel caused its irresponsiveness. 123 The loan servicer subsequently
appealed the court's order denying its motion.124
On appeal, the district court found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
matter, as the bankruptcy court had not awarded damages, and thus,
had not issued an appealable final order.1 25 Although the district court
116. Id. Section 158 also allows district courts to hear appeals of particular interlocutory
orders. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), (3) (2018).
117. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
118. Barben v. Donovan, 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008).
119. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC v. Herendeen, No. 8:17-cv-41-T-33, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70263 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2017).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018).
121. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70263 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2017).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *2-6. In support of its motion, the loan servicer claimed its failure to respond
was the product of excusable neglect and claimed plaintiff filed to adequately serve its
motion for summary judgment. Id. at *5-6.
125. Id. at*10-11.
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recognized determining whether an order is a final order in the
bankruptcy context requires flexibility, the court stressed basic appellate
rules, nevertheless, apply and an order that does not dispose of a claim
is not appealable. 126 Requiring bankruptcy courts to assess damages
before a party appeals, reduces the risk of protracted litigation in attempt
to avoid damages awards. 127 Making bankruptcy appeals particularly
susceptible to prolonged appellate litigation, district court's review of
bankruptcy orders and judgments add an additional layer of judicial
review. 128 Accordingly, the district court held bankruptcy courts must
award damages before parties can appeal a summary judgment order.1 29
The case of Wortley, (discussed in the preceding section) also addresses
what constitutes a final order. There, the Eleventh Circuit determined
that, because neither party consented to the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate non-core claims, the court did not have
jurisdiction to order the dismissal of the claims, and the court's findings
were merely proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 130 This
determination impacted the Eleventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. As
previously discussed, the bankruptcy court in Wortley certified a direct
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.13 1 A direct appeal, however, requires a
final order. Because the bankruptcy court did not have the authority to
issue a final order, the court of appeals found it did not have jurisdiction
over the appeal. 132 Accordingly, the court modified the bankruptcy court's
order, treating the order as proposed finding of fact and law and
transferred the appeal to the district court for a final adjudication of the
claims.133

B. Appellate Attorney's Fees and Violations of the Automatic Stay
When a party willfully violates the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(k)(1)134 allows the debtor to recover actual damages from the
violating party, including allowing the debtor to recover attorney's fees
incurred in litigating the action. 35 The court of appeals in Mantiply v.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *11.
Wortley, 844 F.3d at 1320-22.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Wortley, 844 F.3d at 1321-32.
Id. at 1322.
11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2018).
Id.
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Horne,136 addressed whether § 362(k)(1) allows the debtor to recover
attorney's fees incurred in defending the damage award in subsequent
appellate litigation. 13 7 The court in Mantiply, determined that the
language of the statute and its context within the Code allows recovery
of those fees.138
Even prior to the court's decision, this case was the subject of multiple
appeals and highly contested litigation. The dispute began when
Mantiply, an attorney representing a creditor in the bankruptcy case,
filed an action in state court to recover a pre-petition debt after the debtor
filed a Chapter 7 petition. After being informed of the automatic stay,
Mantiply refused to dismiss the action for more than 200 days. 139 Upon
seeking damages for the violation, the bankruptcy court awarded the
debtor over $80,000, including more than $40,000 in attorney's fees.1 40
Mantiply subsequently appealed the judgment to the district court,
which upheld the bankruptcy court's award. 141 After additional
appeals,1 42 the district court awarded supplementary attorney's fees for
defending the judgment in appellate litigation. 143 Mantiply appealed this
award and the Eleventh Circuit again had the case before it. 144
In this appeal, Mantiply asked the court to determine whether § 362(k)
allows debtors to recover attorney's fees incurred while defending an
award for stay violations. While Mantiply acknowledged § 362(k) awards
attorney's fee in actions seeking sanctions for stay violations, she argued
the statute only awarded debtors attorney's fees incurred while working
to end the stay violations. Fees incurred in pursuing damages or
defending the judgment on appeal, she argued, were outside of the

136. 876 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1082.
139. Id. at 1078-79.
140. See In re Horne, 630 F. App'x 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2017).
141. See Mantiply v. Horne, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48037 (S.D. Ala. 2017).
142. In addition to challenging the initial award, Mantiply filed motions to recuse the
bankruptcy judge and for relief from the judgment. The bankruptcy court denied these
motions, and Mantiply appealed. The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
upheld the bankruptcy court's order but denied Horne's request for fees. Id. Both Horne
and Mantiply appealed these decisions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Horne,
630 F. App'x at 912-13. The court upheld the denial of Mantiply's motions and, after
determining that the district court may have incorrectly refused to grant attorney's fees,
remanded the case to the district court to determine the amount of attorney's fees. Id. at
913. In the district court, the court awarded an additional $14,000 in fees to Horne.
Mantiply, 876 F.3d at 1079.
143. 876 F.3d at 1079.
144. Id. at 1078.
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section's fee shifting provisions.145 The court of appeals disagreed, and
held that § 362(k)'s fee shifting provision extends to both prosecuting
damages and defending judgments on appeal.1 46 The court's analysis
began with the language of the statute, which provides "an individual
injured by any willful violation of a stay ... shall recover actual damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees."1 47 Although the court noted the term
"actual damages" has no consistent legal interpretation, the word
"including" indicates courts should read the statute broadly, extending
"beyond the immediate injury incurred in ending the violation of a
stay."14 8
The court also noted its decision is consistent with similar case law. In
In re Rosenberg,149 the Eleventh Circuit determined a similar fee shifting
provision in § 303(i)(1)150 allowed debtors to recover fees incurred in
defending an award in appellate litigation.1 5 As neither § 303(i)(1) nor
§ 362(k) limited its application to a final order resolving the claim, the
court in Mantiply, determined the Code permitted parties to recover
appellate attorney's fees.1 52 The court of appeals additionally awarded
$30,559.98 in attorney's fees and expenses in connection with this
appeal.153
IV. ABUSE IN CONSUMER CHAPTER 7 CASES
Since enacting the Code in 1978, Congress has made various
amendments to limit the availability of Chapter 7 discharges to debtors
with sufficient income to make ongoing payments to creditors, primarily
by providing mechanisms to dismiss or convert such cases.1 54 The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA),155 for example, lowered the bar for conversion or dismissal
from "substantial abuse" to merely "abuse."15 6 Additionally, the BAPCPA
amendments imposed a presumption of abuse where a consumer debtor's

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
(2005).
155.
156.

Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1080-81.
Id. at 1083; 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
Mantiply, 876 F.3d at 1081.
779 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2015).
11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (2018).
Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1254, 1265.
Mantiply, 876 F.3d at 1081.
Id. at 1085.
See Hon. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 232
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 27 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA amendments].
Id.; see also In re Hardigan, 490 B.R. 437, 451 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013).
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15 7
significantly exceeds
current monthly income, defined in § 101(10A),
159
5
Last year, the
of
expenses.
calculation
§ 707(b)(2)'s 8 complicated
abuse applies
of
presumption
this
whether
Eleventh Circuit addressed
7.160
Chapter
to
a
13
Chapter
from
when the debtor converts
In Pollitzer v. Gebhardt,161 the debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13
of the Code. 162 After confirming a Chapter 13 plan and making payments
for two years the debtor sought to convert the case to a Chapter 7.163 The
bankruptcy court granted the conversion; however, the U.S. Trustee
moved to dismiss the Chapter 7.164 The U.S. Trustee argued the debtor's
current monthly income far exceeded his § 707(b) deductions, giving rise
to the presumption that the petition was abusive. The debtor did not
contest his means tests showed excess income, nor did he rebut the
presumption of abuse; rather, the debtor argued § 707(b)(1) was
inapplicable because the case was originally filed as a Chapter 13.165
Both parties made textual arguments. The debtor argued § 707(b)(1)
allowed a court to dismiss "a case filed by an individual debtor under
[Chapter 7]."166 As his case was filed under Chapter 13, he argued the
section did not apply. The U.S. Trustee contended the court should
interpret the statute differently, arguing the phrase "'under [Chapter
7]'modifies the [preceding] phrase . . . 'an individual debtor"' not the verb
"filed."167 Accordingly, the subsection should be understood to allow a
court to dismiss all Chapter 7 cases filed by an individual debtor if the
court finds "granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of
[Chapter 7]."168
The court determined both interpretations were grammatically and
textually defensible, and applied canons of statutory interpretation. 169
Primarily, the court determined it should "avoid an interpretation of [the
law] that would lead to consequences that are inconsistent with the

157. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2018).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2018).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
160. Pollitzer v. Gebhardt, 860 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2017).
161. 860 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2017).
162. Id. at 1337.
163. Id. A debtor may convert a case under Chapter 13 to one under Chapter 7 pursuant
to § 1307. 11 U.S. C. § 1307 (2018).
164. Pollitzer, 860 F.3d at 1337.
165. Id. at 1337-38.
166. Id. at 1338 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1337 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1)).
169. Id. at 1338.
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statutory scheme under review."1 70 This determination required the court
to examine the "textual evolution" and policy underlying § 707(b)(1),
including those amendments created by BAPCPA. 171 The court concluded
"[t]he history and statutory evolution demonstrates that Congress
intended the current version of § 707(b) to be a potent tool for bankruptcy
courts to expeditiously dismiss Chapter 7 petitions filed by debtors with
income sufficient to pay their creditors." 172 With such a purpose, the court
found "it unlikely-indeed inconceivable-that Congress contemplated"
allowing debtors to circumvent § 707(b) by first filing a Chapter 13
petition and, subsequently, converting the case. 173
V. TREATING CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 13

PLANS

A Chapter 13 plan may provide for claims through payments over the
life of the plan. 174 The debtor's ability to propose this plan is, however,
limited by §§ 1322175 and 1325.176 Recently, a few interesting cases have
addressed whether a debtor can treat a right of redemption through a
Chapter 13 plan. 177 Another case addressed whether a debtor can offer a
balloon payment to satisfy a secured claim through a Chapter 13 plan.1 7 8
Each of these issues is discussed below.
A. Redemption Through a Chapter 13 Plan
In TitleMax v. Northington,179 the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether
a debtor can pay the redemption amount due on a pawned automobile
through a Chapter 13 plan.180 The court determined that, because
Georgia's title-pawn statute automatically transfers title to the pawn
broker when the redemption period expires, 181 a debtor cannot pay the

170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting In re Witcher, 702 F.3d 619, 622 (11th Cir. 2012)).
172. Id. at 1339.
173. Id.
174. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (2018) ("The plan shall provide for the
submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor to
the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan.").
175. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2018).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018).
177. TitleMax v. Northington, 876 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2017); Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
178. In re Cochran, 555 B.R. 892 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2016).
179. 876 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2017).
180. Id.
181. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-403(b)(3) (2017).
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redemption amount through the plan. 182 In the case, the debtor pawned
his vehicle as security for a $4,400 loan. The following month, the debtor
defaulted on the loan. 183 Upon default in title-pawn transactions, Georgia
law gives the debtor a thirty-day redemption period, during which the
debtor must pay the outstanding balance of the loan. 184 If the debtor fails
to pay the redemption amount, title to the vehicle transfers automatically
to the title-pawn lender.185 The debtor in TitleMax, filed his Chapter 13
petition before the end of the redemption period. The plan, filed
simultaneously with the petition, provided for payment of TitleMax's
claim over the duration of the case.186
Seventy-one days after the petition date, TitleMax filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay.' 87 In its motion, TitleMax argued Georgia
law divested the debtor's interest in the vehicle because the redemption
period, extended sixty days after the petition date pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 108(b),188 expired.189 TitleMax did not, however, oppose confirmation,
and the court confirmed the Chapter 13 plan.1so Having confirmed the
plan, the court denied relief from the automatic stay.191 The bankruptcy
court held, by not opposing confirmation, TitleMax waived its argument
that the debtor's interest in the vehicle extinguished when the
redemption period ran.1 92 Alternatively, the bankruptcy court held a
Chapter 13 plan could redeem the debtor's interest in the vehicle by
paying the redemption amount as a claim through the plan. 193
TitleMax's appeal to the Eleventh Circuit addressed both the
procedural issue (whether TitleMax's failure to object to confirmation
waived the title-divestment argument) and the substantive issue
(whether a Chapter 13 plan can redeem property interests through
periodic payments).1 94 Addressing procedure first, the court determined

182. TitleMax, 876 F.3d at 1306.
183. Id.
184. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-403(b)(1) (2017).
185. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-403(b)(3).
186. TitleMax, 876 F.3d at 1306.
187. Id.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2018). This statute extends time periods created by noncure a default, or
bankruptcy law "within which the debtor ... may file any pleading ...
perform any other similar act" to the "later of... the end of such period . .. or 60 days after
[the petition date]." Id.
189. TitleMax, 876 F.3d at 1306.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1306-07.
192. TitleMax v. Hurst (In re Northington), 551 B.R. 542, 548 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2017).
193. In re Northington, 551 B.R. at 546-47.
194. TitleMax, 876 F.3d 1302.
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the bankruptcy court should have interpreted TitleMax's motion for relief
as an objection to confirmation, as TitleMax only needed to change the
caption and prayer for relief for the bankruptcy court to have considered
the motion an objection to confirmation. 195 Additionally, the court noted
the expiration of the redemption period automatically divested the
debtor's interest in the vehicle, and TitleMax did not need "to preserve
its position that [the vehicle] ceased to be estate property." 196
Having resolved the procedural issue, the court next addressed the
substantive issue. 197 The court explained its analysis was a two-part
inquiry: first, the court had to determine whether the vehicle became
property of the estate; second, it must decide whether, after the
expiration of the redemption period, the vehicle remained property of the
estate. 198 The court made "quick work of the first issue," determining the
vehicle was property of the estate at the time of filing, as the redemption
period had not expired on the petition date.199 The court then addressed
whether the vehicle remained in the estate at the time of confirmation,
so that TitleMax's claim in the vehicle could be "'modif[ied]' under §
1322(b)(2)."20 0 To answer this question, the court examined the nature of
the debtor's interest in the property according to state law. 201 As a
general rule, bankruptcy courts "must assume the validity" of a state law
when considering the estate's interests in property as provided by the
state law. 202 Of course, there are exceptions to this general rule; the
TitleMax court, recognized that in particular situations the Code
preempts state law's designation of property rights. 203 The court
explained, however, this exception is limited to those circumstances
where either the federal statute "clearijy] and manifest[1y]" displaces the
state law, or the Code's regulatory scheme impliedly but unambiguously
supersedes state law property rules. 204

195. Id. at 1308 (noting there is "no substantive difference" between an objection to
confirmation and a motion for relief); but see id. at 1320 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting
F.R.B.P. 3015(f) requires objections to confirmation to be "reasonab[1y] notice[d]" and M.D.
Ga. Local Bankr. R. 9004-1(a)(2) prohibits combining objections to confirmation "with other
requests for relief').
196. TitleMax, 876 F.3d at 1308.
197. Id. at 1307.
198. Id. at 1309.
199. Id. at 1309-10.
200. Id. at 1310.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1312 (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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Given this framework, the court determined that the Code did not
preempt Georgia's title-pawn statute. 205 First, the court explained the
automatic stay did not prevent divesting the debtor's interest in the
property. 206 The court explained § 108(b)-rather than § 362-governed
the redemption period because § 108(b) was more specific and an
interpretation that § 362 stays all state law property divestment statutes
makes § 108(b) superfluous. 207 Additionally, the court noted the Code
envisions the bankruptcy estate may "expand or contract in accordance
with . .. underlying state law property rules." 208 This suggests the Code
contemplates state law property rights may divest a debtor's interest in
property, and the Code, in that instance, does not preempt state law
divestment. 209 As the Code neither explicitly displaces nor implicitly
supersedes state law, the court determined that Georgia's title-pawn
statute controls the nature of the estate's interest in the vehicle. 210
Accordingly, when the debtor fails to redeem the property, Georgia law
automatically divests his interest in the property. 211
Finally, the court addressed whether the debtor could treat the
redemption through the plan. 212 Because the debtor's failure to redeem
the property within the extended redemption period divested him of his
interest in the property, the court determined the debtor could not
provide for the title-pawn through the plan. 2 1 3 Though

§

1322 allows a

debtor to modify the rights of a secured creditor, the court noted it was
"axiomatic ... that a plan can 'modify . .. rights' arising under a 'claim'
only if the claim exists at the time the plan would purport to modify the
rights associated with it."214 TitleMax, the court continued, "didn't have
a mere 'claim'-it had (by operation of Georgia law) [the vehicle] ."215
Judge Wilson's dissent in TitleMax, sharply criticized the majority's
holding. 216 The dissent accused the majority of "sidestep[ping]" the res
judicata effect of a confirmed plan to address whether a debtor can
redeem his interest in a title-pawn through a plan provision. 217 The
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.

1314.
1313.
1314.
1315.

1317 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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dissent noted the bankruptcy court rightfully confirmed the plan and
bound the parties to its provisions, including the provision providing for
the debtor's right of redemption. 218 TitleMax did not object to its
treatment under the plan-in fact, the creditor explicitly represented to
the court it did not oppose the plan's confirmation. 219 The dissent also
criticized the majority's holding that a debtor's failure to redeem property
within the time extended by § 108(b) divests the debtor's interest in
property and precludes the debtor from treating the claim in the plan.220
The dissent reasoned that bankruptcy courts sit in equity and have farreaching powers to modify the interests of creditors to confirm feasible
and good faith Chapter 13 plans. 221 As the debtor held title to the vehicle
on the petition date, the bankruptcy estate contained the vehicle, and
TitleMax only held a secured claim in the vehicle. 222 Accordingly, the
dissent claimed § 1322(b)(2) provided sufficient authority to modify
TitleMax's rights through a Chapter 13 plan by paying the claim over the
duration of the plan. 223 After the decision, the debtor filed petition for en
banc reconsideration; the court, however, denied the debtor's request.224
In a similar context, many of the circuit's bankruptcy courts have
addressed whether a debtor may use a Chapter 13 plan to redeem the
debtor's interest in real estate foreclosed through delinquent property tax
adjudication. 225 Similar to its title-pawn statute, Georgia's property tax
foreclosure statute gives purchasers of levied property an interest in the
property that is subject only to the taxpayer's timely redemption. 226 If the
taxpayer fails to redeem the property, his interest is extinguished and
the tax-lien purchaser has a fee simple interest in the property. 227
Bankruptcy courts have disagreed on the effect of filing a Chapter 13 plan
before the expiration of the redemption period.228

218. Id. at 1320.
219. Id. at 1319.
220. Id. at 1323-25.
221. Id. at 1322-23 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 1324.
223. Id.
224. TitleMax v. Gustavious A. Wilber, No. 16-17468 (11th Cir. filed Jan. 2, 2018).
225. In re Jimerson, 564 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017).
226. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 (2017).
227. Id.
228. E.g., Francis v. Scorpion Grp., LLC (In re Francis), 489 B.R. 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2013) (finding the debtor retains an interest in the property upon filing that continues over
the duration of the case); Callaway v. Harvest Assets, LLC (In re Callaway), 2015 Bankr.
LEXIS 4525 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 6, 2015) (holding the debtor has no interest in levied
property, only a right to redeem; accordingly, the property is not a part of the estate).
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In the past year, courts in this circuit have added to the case law
governing these circumstances. In the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern
District of Georgia, these decisions have indicated a tendency to allow
the Chapter 13 plan to address the redemption payment.229 The district
court on appeal, however, reversed one of those decisions. 230
The facts in these cases are largely similar. The debtors owned real
estate that they did not use as a primary residence. Prior to filing a
bankruptcy proceeding, the debtors fell delinquent on annual property
taxes, which, by operation of Georgia law, are secured by the real
estate. 23 1 When the delinquencies continued to accrue, the counties
executed the tax liens and sold tax foreclosure deeds to tax-lien
purchasers subject to the debtor's right of redemption. 232 Before the
expiration of the debtors' rights, they filed Chapter 13 plans that
proposed paying the redemption through disbursements, to which the
tax-sale purchasers objected. 233
The bankruptcy courts' analyses largely focused on whether the
debtors' rights to redeem were property of the estate and, if so, whether
the tax purchasers' interests were claims. Unanimously, these courts
held that, even after tax-lien sales, a taxpayer retains important
ownership rights in the property that, upon filing a bankruptcy petition,
become property of the estate. 234 Further, each court determined that the
tax-sale purchasers' rights to foreclose or, alternatively, their right to
receive redemption payments were claims within the meaning of the
Code. 235 The courts compared the tax purchasers' rights to the rights of
the non-recourse mortgagee in Johnson v. Home State Bank,236 which the
237
Supreme Court determined was a "claim" as defined in the Code.
229. In re Jimerson, 564 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017); In re Alexander, 578 B.R. 669
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017); Encore Assets, LLC v. Woodley (In re Woodley), 59 B.R. 630 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2017).
230. Deed CO, LLC v. Clarence Jimerson, 17-CV-513-WSD (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2018).
231. See O.C.G.A. § 48-2-56(a).
232. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 (2018).
233. Jimerson, 564 B.R. at 432-33; Alexander, 578 B.R. at 672; Encore Assets, 579 B.R.
at 632.
234. Jimerson, 564 B.R. at 436 ("the delinquent taxpayer retains all the remaining
rights in the 'bundle of rights,' including, inter alia, the right to possession, use, and
proceeds."); Alexander, 578 B.R. at 674 (same); Encore Assets, 579 B.R. at 636 ("[t]he
delinquent taxpayer continues to own the property until the redemption right terminates.").
235. Jimerson, 564 B.R. at 437-38. Section 101(5) of the Bankrupty Code defines a claim
as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment ... or a right to
an equitable remedy for breach of performance." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2018).
236. 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
237. Jimerson, 564 B.R. at 437 (finding compelling the argument that "the interest that
a tax deed holder possesses is the same as the interest held by the nonrecourse mortgagee
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Because the bankruptcy courts recognized the debtors' rights to the real
estate as property of the estate and the tax purchasers' right to the
redemption payment a claim, each held § 1322-rather than § 108238governed the Code's treatment of the plan. 239 Because the properties were
not the debtors' primary residences, § 1322(b)(2)240 did not prevent them
from modifying the rights of the lien holder. Accordingly, the courts
allowed the modification of the tax-sale purchasers' claims through the
Chapter 13 plan. 241

The tax-sale purchaser in In re Jimerson242 appealed the bankruptcy
court's conclusion that the redemption was a claim. The tax-sale
purchaser argued the bankruptcy court erred in determining the debtor
could modify the purchaser's interest in the property. 243 The district court
agreed. 244 The court, like the court of appeals in TitleMax, held Georgia's
property tax-sale statute divests the debtor's interest in the property
automatically upon the debtor's failure to timely redeem. 245 The Code
does not preempt this operation of state law because the right to
redemption "is an option, not an obligation," and therefore, is not
comparable to a secured claim such as those held by mortgagees. 246
Despite the similarities with the non-recourse mortgage in Johnson, the
court explained Eleventh Circuit precedent distinguishes the treatment
of a right of redemption under Chapter 13 from a non-recourse obligation
and prevents the bankruptcy court from "modify[ing] the terms of a
statutory right of redemption." 247

in Johnson.") (citing Francis v. Scorpion Grp. LLC, 489 B.R. 262, 268-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2013); Encore Assets, 579 B.R. at 637 ("The analogy to non-recourse mortgages is
compelling.").
238. 11 U.S.C. § 108 (2018).
239. See Jimerson, 564 B.R. at 440-41. The court also made an alternative holding. Id.
The court held that, if § 108(b) and § 1322 were in irreconcilable conflict, the court should
apply § 1322 because the section is more specific. Id. at 441. In Encore Assets, the court did
not address § 108 because the lien purchaser failed to serve the barrment notice. 579 B.R.
at 639. Nevertheless, the court found the rights of the tax purchasers could be modified
pursuant to § 1322. Encore Assets, 579 B. R. at 638-39.
240. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2018).
241. Jimerson, 564 B.R. at 442; Alexander, 578 B.R. at 680; Encore Assets, 579 B.R. at
638-39.
242. 564 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017).
243. Id. at 433.
244. Id. at 442.
245. Id.
246. Id. at *12-13.
247. Id. at *13.
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B. Balloon Payments in a Chapter 13 Plan
Many bankruptcy courts within the Eleventh Circuit have addressed
whether a Chapter 13 plan can provide for a claim through a lump sum
payment in full satisfaction of the debt, often referred to as a balloon
payment. 248 These courts have nearly unanimously adopted the view,
that the Code prohibits these payments. 249 The Middle District of
Georgia's Bankruptcy Court in In re Cochran,250 however, sided with the
minority of courts on the issue, finding that the Code does not prohibit a
balloon payment. 251 In Cochran, the debtor submitted a Chapter 13 plan
that proposed to satisfy the secured claim of RREF II PB-GA, LLC's
(RREF) through limited monthly payments and a final balloon payment.
To fund these disbursements, the debtor testified-without objectionthat a lender assured him he could obtain a loan with his wife listed as a
co-signer. In order to qualify, however, the debtor needed six additional
months of income history. 252
RREF objected to this treatment in the plan. Primarily, RREF argued
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I) prohibits a Chapter 13 plan from offering balloon
payments to satisfy a claim over the objection of a secured creditor. 253
The subsection requires a Chapter 13 plan to provide the full value of
each secured claim and, if the claim is paid through periodic payments,
those payments must "be in equal monthly amounts." 254 Because the plan
provided monthly payments and a final balloon payment, RREF argued
the plan's disbursements were not in equal monthly amounts, and
255
accordingly, the plan did not comply with the Code.

248. E.g., In re Spark, 509 B.R. 728 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Kirk, 465 B.R. 300
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012); Wells Fargo Fin. Ga. v. Baxter (In re Williams), 385 B.R. 468
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008).
249. Id.; see also Flynn v. Bankowski (In re Flynn), 402 B.R. 437 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009);
In re Soppick, 516 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Wagner, 342 B.R. 766 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2006).
250. 555 B.R. 892 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2016).
251. Id. at 896.
252. Id. at 895. As the debtor's wife would assume joint liability on the loan, she needed
to show income history. Id. The wife's income, however, only recently increased. Id. While
her income was sufficient to underwrite the loan, the lender required the wife to show she
received this income over the course of six months. Id.
253. Id. at 895-96. RREF also argued that the plan was unfeasible. Id. at 896.The court
overruled this objection, as RREF did not rebut the debtor's testimony that he would qualify
for a loan. Id.
254. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2018).
255. Cochran, 555 B.R. at 896.
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The bankruptcy court first addressed whether a balloon payment is a
periodic payment by defining the terms. 256 Periodic payments, the court
determined, were payments that "occurf[ 'at regular intervals,' and occur
'repeatedly from time to time."' 257 Balloon payments, on the other hand,
fully satisfy the claim and, thus, cannot reoccur. 258 Balloon payments
and periodic payments, the courts deduced, are different types of
payment. 259 Because the Code only prohibits unequal periodic payments,
the court held that the prohibition does not apply to balloon payments. 260
Further, the court noted § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I) does not require all
property disbursed through the plan to come from one source of
payment. 261 In fact, courts have generally allowed debtors to use
combinations of property and different payments to satisfy secured
claims. 262 Accordingly, the court held the Code allows a debtor to pay a
secured claim by providing both periodic payments and a balloon
payment. 263

VI. DISCHARGEABIITY
Very generally, a discharge of a consumer's debts in bankruptcy
enjoins actions to collect most pre-petition debts. 264 The Code, however,
provides numerous exceptions to discharge that limit the injunction's
application to particular debts. For example, the Code excludes certain
taxes, domestic support obligations, and restitution from discharge. 265
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, this year,
addressed two of these exceptions: § 523(a)(2), debt incurred by false
pretenses or fraud, and § 523(a)(19), 266 debt incurred for violations of

federal or state securities laws. Each is addressed in the subsections
below.

256. Id. at 898.
257. Id.
258. Id. (defining a balloon payment as "[a] final loan payment that is usually much
larger than the preceding regular payments and that discharges the principal balance of
the loan.") (quoting Balloon Payment, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 899.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 906.
264. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2018).
265. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1) (2018), § 523(a)(5) (2018), § 523(a)(13) (2018) respectively.
266. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2018).
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A. False Statements Respecting the Debtor's FinancialCondition
Section 523(a)(2) 267 makes a debt non-dischargeable where the debtor
made false statements to induce a creditor to extend, renew, or refinance
a debt. The subsection, however, makes an important distinction when
the statement concerns the debtor's financial condition. 268 In that
circumstance, the discharge exception only applies where the statement
is in writing. 269 If the debtor makes an oral, false-even fraudulentstatement regarding his financial condition that induces a lender to
extend credit, the debt to the lender is nevertheless dischargeable. 270
Given that distinction, whether an oral statement respects the debtor's
financial condition is often dispositive in a dischargeablity action under
§ 523(a)(2). 271
In Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP, 272 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed whether a false, oral statement about a single asset was a
statement "respecting the debtor's financial condition." 273 In the case, the
debtor, who had fallen significantly behind on legal fees pertaining to
non-bankruptcy litigation, orally represented to his attorneys that he
would receive a large tax refund and would use that money to pay his
attorney's fees. In reliance on the debtor's promise, the attorneys
continued their representation and extended the bill's due date. The
debtor, however, did not remit his tax refund to his attorneys and,
instead, used the refund to pay business debts. When the debtor filed
bankruptcy, the law firm initiated an adversary proceeding. In that
litigation, the law firm argued the debtor's statement regarding the tax
return was made under false pretenses, and pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A),
the debt was nondischargeable. 274 Appling argued his statement
"respect[ed] ... [his] financial condition," and thus, § 523(a)(2)(A) did not
apply. 275 Rather, he argued § 523(a)(2)(B) would govern, and because the
debtor made the statement orally, the debt was dischargeable. 276
Whether a statement regarding one asset can be a statement
"respecting the debtor's financial condition" has divided courts of appeals

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
848 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 957.
Id. at 955-56.
Id. at 956.
Id.
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in other circuits, 277 though, prior to this case, the Eleventh Circuit had
not considered the issue. The court in Appling, began its analysis with
the language of the statute, looking to the ordinary meaning of each word
and the use of the word in the context of the Code. 278 "Financial

condition," the court deduced, likely means the debtor's "overall financial
status," that is, the sum of the debtor's assets and liabilities. 279 Though
this phrase pertains to the entirety of the debtor's finances, the court
noted § 523(a)(2)(B)(ii) 280 indicates the statement does not have to fully
describe the debtor's finances to be within the discharge exception. 281
Rather, the subsection pertains to statements "respecting" the debtor's
finances. 282 Respecting, the court continued, means "related to" or
"concerning." 283 For § 523(a)(2)(B)(ii) to apply then, the statement needs
only to "relate to" or "concern" the debtor's assets and liabilities.
Accordingly, the court held a statement regarding the debtor's tax refund
concerns his financial condition because the tax refund was an asset and,
284
therefore, relates to the debtor's total assets and liabilities.
The court then addressed the law firm's various arguments against
the court's interpretation. 285 The law firm suggested "respecting" was
only a preposition "necessary to connect two related terms," and that the
court should not read the word to limit the Code's application to
fraudulent conduct. 286 The court rebutted that canons of statutory
interpretation require it to consider all words in the statute, even
prepositions. 287 Additionally, the law firm argued legislative history often
used "financial statement" (as opposed to a "statement respecting the
debtor's

. . . financial condition")

when discussing the discharge

exception, indicating a court should focus its analysis on the debtor's
balance sheet not on particular assets. 288 Again, the court looked no

277. E.g., compare Engler v. Steinburg, 744 F. 2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1984) with In re
Bandi, 683 F.3d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 2012).
278. Appling, 848 F.3d at 957.
279. Id. at 958.
280. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2018).
281. Appling, 848 F.3d at 957.
282. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(ii).
283. Appling, 848 F.3d at 958 (quoting Respecting, WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2123 (2d ed. 1961)).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 959-60.
286. Id. at 959.
287. Id. ("[S]ometimes the canon [of ordinary meaning] governs the interpretation of so
simple a word as a preposition.") (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012)).

288. Id.
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further than the text of the statute in its interpretation, noting the words
"financial statement" are not found in the subsection. 289 The court also
commented that § 523(a)(2)(A)'s reference to common law torts that
require a statement-the torts of false pretenses and false
representation-clearly indicates that the section's use of the word
"statements" does not refer exclusively to financial statements. 290
On January 2, 2018, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of
certiorari. 291 Accordingly, bankruptcy courts will look for further
guidance on this issue.
B. Violations of Securities Laws
Section § 523(a)(19)(A) 292 precludes a debtor from discharging debts
related to a "violation of any of the Federal securities laws [,] . . . any of

the State securities laws, or any regulation or order issued under such
Federal or State securities laws." 293 Courts of Appeals across the country
have struggled with whether a court must find the debtor (as opposed to
a corporate entity controlled by the debtor) violated applicable securities
laws or regulation. 294 The Eleventh Circuit in Lunsford v. Process
Technologies Services, LLC,295 addressed this question, though, as the

concurrence complains, it did so with an alternative holding that may
cause confusion in future litigation. 296
Prior to filing of his petition, the debtor in Lunsford, was the president
of a business, MIPCO, LLC (MIPCO). In a meeting with a purchaser,
regarding the sale of MIPCO securities, the debtor represented that
MIPCO had over $1 million in tangible assets and $500,000 in intangible
assets. The debtor did not, however, disclose title problems related to
MIPCO's tangible assets and did not disclose the company had yet to
acquire the represented intangible assets. When the purchaser
discovered this, it sued in a Mississippi state court. The parties
ultimately disposed of this action through an arbitration proceeding,
which awarded $606,892 to the securities purchaser. The arbitrator's
findings, which the state court confirmed, assessed joint and several
liability on MIPCO, the debtor, and another individual not named in the

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling, 2018 U.S. LEXIS at *4262 (2018).
292. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A) (2018).
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Okla. Dep't of Sec. ex. rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2012);
In re Sherman, 658 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011).
295. 848 F.3d 963 (11th Cir. 2017).
296. Id. at 969 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
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decision. After the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, the purchaser
successfully pursued an order finding the debt non-dischargeable
pursuant to § 523(a)(19)(A). 297
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court in Lunsford, first
examined whether the bankruptcy court clearly erred in determining the
arbitrator found the debtor violated state securities laws. 298 The
bankruptcy court did not make explicit findings of facts, but instead
adopted the arbitrator's findings. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
determined the bankruptcy court had "ample support from the
arbitrator's award" to find the debtor violated the state's securities law
and the bankruptcy court's order was not clearly erroneous. 299 The
Eleventh Circuit then turned to an alternative argument for upholding
the bankruptcy court's order.300 The court addressed whether, pursuant
to § 523(a)(19)(A), the debtor must have personally violated the state
securities act.301 To answer this question, the court examined the
subsection's first clause: "debt that is for." 302 In a prior case, the Supreme
Court of the United States interpreted this clause to mean "debt as a
result of' or "debt with respect to."303 Accordingly, the court in Lunsford
determined § 523(a)(19)(A) applied to all debts incurred as a result of a
violation of a securities law or regulation, regardless of the debtor's
actions. 304
Judge Rosenbaum's concurrence criticized the majority's alternative
holding. 305 The concurring judge worried the alternative decision created
unnecessary confusion in the law and would have ended the court's
analysis with determining the bankruptcy court's findings were not
clearly erroneous. 306 By holding § 523(a)(19)(A) only requires a finding
that the debt was a result of a securities violation, the concurrence feared
the majority may have unintentionally over-extended its holding and
created confusion. 307 For example, although the majority suggested it
may not extend its holding where an innocent investor in a Ponzi scheme
is ordered to pay restitution, through the majority's reasoning those

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

965-66.
966.
967.

968.

970 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
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restitution awards would be the result of the principal's securities
violations. 308 Accordingly, innocent investors would be unable to
discharge debts incurred due to their fiduciary's fraud.309
VI. CONCLUSION

The last year saw continued development of bankruptcy law in the
Eleventh Circuit. The cases that were decided show courts in this circuit
are committed to strict textual interpretations of the Code. Practicing
attorneys in the Eleventh Circuit, therefore, would be well-served to
familiarize themselves with the canons of statutory interpretation. To a
limited degree, the decisions also indicate some confusion. The issue of
whether a Chapter 13 debtor may redeem certain property through a
Chapter 13 plan, in particular, has created some ambiguity in the law
and even disagreement among court of appeals judges. Nevertheless, the
Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in Slater v. U.S. Steel, 310 indicates the
circuit is committed to resolving uncertainties and discrepancies in the
law. Practitioners should accordingly anticipate future decisions ironing
out the law in this Circuit.

308. Id.
309. Id. at 971.
310. 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016).
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